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AN UNCERTAIN RISK AND AN
UNCERTAIN FUTURE:
ASSESSING THE LEGAL
IMPLICATIONS OF MERCURY
AMALGAM FILLINGS
Mary Ann Chirba-Martint
Carolyn M Welshhanst
I. INTRODUCTION
Trying to buy a mercury thermometer at the local pharmacy these
days will result in a deluge of information regarding the risks of mer-
cury and the proper disposal protocol for mercury thermometers as
hazardous waste. Yet, inquiring about the risks of placing mercury in
one's mouth, in the form of a dental filling, is likely to meet with re-
sounding assurances of safety from the dental profession. According
to the American Dental Association, "[d]ental amalgam has been stud-
ied and reviewed extensively, and has established an extensively re-
viewed record of safety and effectiveness." 1 While such comforting
disclaimers are meant to ease patient concerns, many continue to
worry about the safety of dental mercury. Thus, "[t]here are a grow-
ing number of scientific studies that document pathophysiologic ef-
fects associated with amalgam mercury."' Today, according to a sur-
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1 AM. DENTAL Ass'N, ADA STATEMENT ON DENTAL AMALGAM, at
http://www.ada.org/prof/resources/positions/statements/amalgam.asp (last modified
Jan. 8, 2002) [hereinafter ADA STATEMENT].
2 DAMS Inc., Mercury Free and Healthy, at http://www.amalgam.org (Janu-
ary 2004).
vey of 1000 people, nearly 50% of Americans believe that mercury
fillings cause health problems.
3
Considering these widely disparate points of view and growing
public concern, the delay in litigation involving mercury amalgam
fillings may come as somewhat of a surprise. What is even more sur-
prising is that the mercury amalgam debate began over 150 years ago.
In the 1830s and '40s, the American Society of Dental Surgeons
("ASDS") caused an uproar when it demanded that its dentists sign a
pledge not to use mercury fillings.4 By the 1850s, however, the
ASDS's membership had declined to the point that it was forced to
disband. 5  In its place arose the American Dental Association
("ADA"), composed largely of mercury amalgam advocates.6
Despite this long and contentious history, there has been very lit-
tle case law or clinical research dealing directly with mercury amal-
gams. As indicated by even those groups that support mercury fill-
ings, it remains unclear exactly how much mercury enters the body
from fillings, as well as at exactly what levels mercury becomes harm-
ful to humans.7 While the debate over the scientific validity of mer-
cury's perceived health risks continues, patient concerns about amal-
gams are quite genuine. And, because such patients view mercury
risks as material to their decisions regarding treatment options, the
doctrine of informed consent should apply. Nevertheless, the dental
profession has basically ignored its duty to disclose material risks and
has taken overt measures to ban its members from discussing potential
risks with patients.
This article will begin by describing the many safety concerns that
surround the use of dental amalgam. It will briefly overview how
other nations and even the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
("FDA") have taken preliminary steps to safeguard patient safety. It
will then examine the dental industry's use of professional discipline
and malpractice litigation to prevent and even punish full disclosure of
amalgam risks. This discussion will also examine how, given such
bans on information, patients have sought recourse through litigation,
3 Laura Bradbard, Dental Amalgam: Filling a Need or Foiling Health?,
FDA CONSUMER, Dec. 1993, at 22 (discussing consumer sentiment toward mercury
amalgam fillings).
4 Consumer Cause, Inc. v. Smilecare, 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d 627, 630 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2001).
5Id.
6 Id.
7 See, e.g., Dental Devices: Classification of Encapsulated Amalgam Alloy
and Dental Mercury and Reclassification of Dental Mercury; Issuance of Special
Controls for Amalgam Alloy, 67 Fed. Reg. 7620, 7622 (proposed February 20, 2002)
(codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 872) [hereinafter "Dental Devices"].
but face numerous obstacles to recovery, including serious evidentiary
hurdles regarding admissibility and causation.8 For these reasons, the
article will conclude by showing how legislation at the state level ap-
pears to offer the best strategy for insuring that dental patients are
adequately informed of the risks associated with mercury fillings.
Nevertheless, it will explain why and how state laws must be carefully
crafted in order to survive preemption by federal regulations. Sadly,
patients who should be able to rely upon their dentists for complete
and accurate information regarding the risks and benefits of amalgam,
cannot expect such a disclosure.
Moreover, while a patient's legal right to information concerning
the risks and benefits of amalgams should be straightforward, the in-
terplay of professional regulation with state statutory and tort law,
FDA regulations, and the shadow of federal preemption add to the
uncertainties and worries of dental patients. Only by disentangling
conflicting concerns and competing strategies can a dental patient's
right to informed and autonomous decision-making be effectuated.
This article endeavors to begin that process.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Professional Regulation: ADA Hostility to the Anti-Amalgam
Position
An amalgam is a mixture of metals, and dental mercury amalgams
are comprised of approximately 50% mercury, 35% silver, 9% tin, 6%
copper, and trace amounts of zinc. 9 Although the mixture is soft at
first, it eventually hardens and the mercury is bound within it.' ° The
Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, a branch of the
Centers for Disease Control, admits that small amounts of mercury are
released slowly from the filling into the body due to factors such as
corrosion, chewing, and grinding of the teeth." According to a study
published by the American Academy of Pediatrics, "increased mer-
See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (hold-
ing that in order for scientific evidence to be admitted at trial, the court must look at
more than just "general acceptance" in the field).
9 AGENCY FOR Toxic SUBSTANCES AND DISEASE REGISTRY, PUBLIC HEALTH
STATEMENT FOR MERCURY (describing ways of being exposed to mercury and the
possible consequences), available at http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/toxprofiles/phs46.html
(Mar. 1999).
10 Id.
11 Id.
cury vapor concentrations can be measured in exhaled air from people
with dental amalgams, but the biological significance is uncertain.'
12
The ADA's website is nevertheless replete with information ex-
tolling the safety and virtues of mercury amalgam.' 3 The ADA cites
the World Health Organization, the FDA, and the United States Public
Health Service, among others, as agencies that support mercury amal-
gam's continuing safety. 14 Among the purported advantages are mer-
cury amalgam's lower costs, easier use, and greater durability as com-
pared to alternative materials. 15 The ADA therefore lends its dentists'
seal of approval to a variety of amalgam products, an action that some
challenge as a conflict of interest because the ADA allegedly is paid
for such endorsements.
16
The general controversy over the effects of mercury amalgam can
be broken down into specific debates regarding: 1) what levels of
mercury are released from fillings, 2) whether such exposure only
affects those with a local mercury allergy, 3) how many people are
susceptible to mercury allergies, and 4) what are the effects of mer-
cury exposure to the overall population. To the extent that the ADA
has acknowledged cases involving adverse reactions to mercury fill-
ings, it has characterized them as "rare instances of local side effects
of allergic reactions."'17 Local symptoms of a mercury allergy can
resemble a typical skin rash. The ADA contends that "[o]ften patients
who are truly allergic to amalgam have a medical or family history of
allergies to metals,"'18 and estimates that there have been less than 100
cases of allergic reactions to amalgam fillings.19 According to the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, fifty cases of amalgam
allergies have been reported in the scientific literature.2a Yet, British
authorities that, like the ADA, support amalgam use suggest that the
12 Lynn R. Goldman et al., Technical Report: Mercury in the Environment:
Implications for Pediatricians, 108 AM. ACAD. PEDIATRICS 197, 201 (2001) (review-
ing current information on mercury treatment and prevention for pediatricians).
13 See ADA STATEMENT, supra note 1 (stating that there is a lack of research
showing the adverse effects of amalgam).
14 id.
15 See id. (stating the advantages of amalgam fillings, but not asserting that
they are better than the alternatives).
16 Amy Pyle, A Debate on Mercury in Fillings, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 25, 1999, at
1A.
17 ADA STATEMENT, supra note 1.
18 ADA, ORAL HEALTH Topics A-Z: DENTAL FILLING OPTIONS - FREQUENTLY
ASKED QUESTIONS, at http://www.ada.org/public/topics/fillings-faq.asp (last visited
Jan. 28, 2004).
19 Id.
20 Bradbard, supra note 3, at 24 (citing Stephen Corbin from the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention).
numbers of people prone to mercury allergies may be as high as three
percent of the general population, or 1.75 million people in Great
Britain alone.2'
The amount of mercury vapor released by dental amalgams has
garnered particular concern. According to the ADA, mercury fillings
emit only one to three micrograms of mercury per day, as compared to
five or six micrograms that most people ingest daily through food,
water, and the air.22 The ADA reasons that at these low levels, it
would take 500 fillings to do any damage to the human body.23 In
contrast, studies conducted by the World Health Organization posit
that a single filling may release anywhere between three to seventeen
micrograms of mercury per day.24 That mercury amalgams pose a
larger problem than the ADA is willing to admit is reinforced by a
1997 Environmental Protection Agency report indicating that "noth-
ing deposits more inorganic mercury into the body than [mercury]
fillings." 25 Plus, the United States Department of Health and Human
Services states that "[a] correlation has been found between inorganic
mercury in human breast milk and mercury-silver dental amalgams in
the mother."
26
Such contrary viewpoints exist at the international level as well.
For example, the British government agrees with the ADA that mer-
cury fillings are safe and only cause health problems in those pre-
disposed to mercury allergies. Nevertheless, it is more cautious than
the ADA because it warns that "it may be prudent to avoid, where
clinically reasonable, the placement or removal of amalgam fillings
during pregnancy. ' 27 Moreover, unlike Britain's modest assessment
of the risks of mercury amalgams, a growing number of countries
view them as posing significant risks and, therefore, are becoming
increasingly proactive in limiting their use. Accordingly, the Swedish
government refuses to pay for amalgam fillings under the country's
nationalized health plan.28 Dentists in Denmark and Finland are ad-
21 Frances Ive, Health: Are You Sick to the Back Teeth?, MIRROR, Apr. 6,
2002, at 32 (discussing British dental concerns about mercury amalgams).
22 David Wahlberg, Health Living: Fill It Up But With What?, ATLANTA J. &
CONST., April 9, 2002, at IF.
23 ADA, DENTAL AMALGAM: MYTHS Vs. FACTS, at
http://www.ada.org/public/media/releases/0207_release0 l.asp (July 2002).
24 Ive, supra note 21.
25 Pyle, supra note 16.
26 Jeri Weiss et al., Mercury Exposure Risks: Human Exposure to Inorganic
Mercury, 114 PuB. HEALTH REP. 400,400-01 (1999) (illustrating the various sources
of inorganic mercury exposure).
27 Ive, supra note 21.
28 id.
vised to use alternative materials in dental restorations. 29 The Austra-
lian, Austrian, Canadian, German, and Norwegian governments rec-
ommend that mercury amalgams not be used in pregnant women,
children, and people with kidney diseases. 30 The ADA and the anti-
amalgam organizations hotly contest the position of the international
community with regard to the risks of mercury amalgam. 31 The exis-
tence of this debate shows that the amalgam issue is far from settled.
What is clear, however, is that these countries, like the United States,
will continue to grapple with how to weigh the benefits of mercury
amalgam against its uncertain, but potentially serious, risks.
To date, the United States government, acting primarily through
the FDA, has largely deferred to the ADA's position that mercury
amalgams are highly beneficial and pose only slight risks in rare
cases. Nevertheless, the FDA does acknowledge that it lacks the in-
formation necessary to state with certainty that mercury amalgam is
entirely safe.32 In response to growing pressures from consumer
safety advocates, the FDA decided in 2002 to reclassify dental amal-
gam from a Class I to a Class II device.33 This change requires dental
amalgam manufacturers to list all ingredients on the product's label
34
and encourages dentists and patients to report side effects as "adverse
events. 35 Such a move "will provide consistent regulation of dental
mercury and dental amalgam products," and it is accompanied by a
consideration of even more stringent labeling and warning require-
ments for dental amalgam.36 Nevertheless, the FDA continues to
share the ADA's position on mercury amalgam safety, justifying the
29 Wahlberg, supra note 22.
30 Ive, supra note 21; Pyle, supra note 16.
31 See, e.g., Mercury in Dental Fillings Disclosure and Prohibition Act, H.R.
4163, 107th Cong. (2002) (citing Health Canada as recognizing that children and
pregnant women are at risk from mercury amalgam); CTR. FOR DEVICES AND
RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., CONSUMER UPDATE: DENTAL
AMALGAMS (citing Health Canada as an example of disagreement between the U.S.
and Canada on whether to limit the use of dental amalgams in certain members of the
population), at http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/consumer/amalgams/html (last modified
Dec. 31, 2002).
32 See Dental Devices, supra note 7, at 7627.
13 Id. at 7620.
34 Id. at 7627.
35 See U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADM1N., STATEMENT BY DAVID W. FEIGAL,
M.D., M.P.H., DiR., CTR. FOR DEVICES AND RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH, BEFORE THE
Comm. ON GOV'T REFORM, U.S. HOUSE OF REPS., Nov. 14,2002 ("Class II devices...
are subject to 'special controls.' These range from post-market surveillance studies to
conformance with mandatory performance standards."), at http://www.
fda.gov/ola/2002/dentall 1 14.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2004).
36 See Dental Devices, supra note 7, at 7620.
new classification as protecting those few individuals who may be
allergic to mercury.37
Despite the assurances of the FDA and ADA, many continue to
question the safety of mercury amalgam and the wisdom behind plac-
ing mercury in one's mouth. The growing concern about long-term
exposure to even small amounts of mercury is demonstrated by chang-
ing practice patterns in the dental profession. In 2001, 24% of dentists
used no mercury fillings at all.38 This figure represented an increase
of almost 15% in just four years of dentists who refused to use mer-
cury amalgams. 39 The Director of the ADA Health Foundation's Paf-
fenarger Research Center attributes the decline in amalgam use to
aesthetics, patient preferences, and scientific advances, rather than to
safety concerns, stating, "there is no indication that these general
trends are related to so-called 'toxicity. ' ' 40 Yet, according to a survey
by Dental Products Report, 80% of dentists say they have received
patient requests to remove mercury amalgam fillings for non-aesthetic
reasons.
4 1
The ADA's ethical rules, which typically are adopted in similar
form by state dental boards, reflect the ADA's suspicions about den-
tists who advocate mercury removal. Rule 5.A states that "[d]entists
shall not represent the care being rendered to their patients in a false
or misleading manner.' '42 An advisory opinion on this rule explains
that:
Based on current scientific data, the ADA has determined that
the removal of amalgam restorations from the non-allergic pa-
tient for the alleged purpose of removing toxic substances
from the body, when such treatment is performed solely at the
recommendation or suggestion of the dentist, is improper and
unethical. The same principle of veracity applies to the den-
tist's recommendation concerning the removal of any dental
restorative material.43
31 Id. at 7627.
31 Carol M. Ostron, Fillings Made With Mercury Have Supporters, Detrac-
tors Among Experts, SEATTLE TIMEs, June 8, 2002, Domestic News Section.
39 id.
40 Mark Berthold, Restoratives: Trend Data Show Shift in Use of Materials,
June 4, 2002, at http://www.ada.org/prof/pubs/daily/0206/0604res.html.
41 Ostron, supra note 38.
42 PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS AND CODE OF PROF'L CONDUCT § 5.A. (Am. Dental
Ass'n 2003), available at http://www.ada.org/prof/prac/law/code/index.asp (last
visited Feb. 13, 2004).41 Id. at § 5.A. 1.
A dentist who is found guilty of violating the ADA Code of Eth-
ics may be sentenced, censured, suspended, or expelled from the
ADA.44
Other ADA rules also have implications for potential disciplinary
proceedings over mercury amalgams. Advisory Opinion 5.A.2 pro-
vides that a dentist who represents that a dental treatment or technique
"has the capacity to diagnose, cure or alleviate diseases, infections or
other conditions, when such representations are not based upon ac-
cepted scientific knowledge or research, is acting unethically. '45 Fur-
ther, since the ADA views amalgam removal as unnecessary, recom-
mending removal can run afoul of Rule 5.B, which makes it unethical
for a dentist to represent fees in a "false or misleading manner." As
a result, "[a] dentist who recommends and performs unnecessary den-
tal services or procedures is engaged in unethical conduct. ''47
One early example of professional discipline in this context is the
1990 case of Board of Dental Examiners v. Hufford, which involved a
dentist who advised a full mouth extraction of his patient's mercury-
filled teeth in order to arrest the progression of her multiple sclero-
sis. 48 Iowa's state dental board suspended Dr. Hufford's license for
five years on the grounds that extracting all of his patient's teeth was
fraudulent and violated numerous statutes and professional rules per-
taining to the practice of dentistry. 49 Dr. Hufford appealed the board's
ruling, emphasizing that the patient affirmatively sought him out spe-
cifically because of his anti-amalgam position.50 Although the court
acknowledged this fact, it focused on Dr. Hufford's failure to explic-
itly discuss the majority position on mercury amalgam safety.51 Of
even greater concern to the court, however, were the prohibitive costs
of alternative treatments, which led the patient to choose the less ex-
pensive, but riskier, full mouth extraction.5 2 In the court's view, these
price figures indicated that Dr. Hufford did not believe his amalgam
position, but rather was interested in the personal profit he could ob-
tain from the removal procedure. 3 In this regard, the court referred to
44 Id. at ch. IV.
45 Id. at § 5.A.2.
46 Id. at § 5.B.
41 Id. at § 5.B.6.
48 Bd. of Dental Exam'rs v. Hufford, 461 N.W.2d 194 (Iowa 1990) (holding
that dentist's treatment of multiple sclerosis by full mouth extraction of patient's teeth
fell far below the standard of care).
49 Id. at 196.
50 Id.
5' Id. at 198.
52 Id. at 197.
13 See id. at 197-98.
the dentistry board's findings that Dr. Hufford did not extract the teeth
for dental reasons-but, again, that board was not about to recognize
reducing mercury exposure as a valid reason for treatment.
54
While the Hufford facts raise issues of informed consent and duty
of care, the disciplinary board and court minimized the significance of
the patient's wishes. Instead, both the state dental board and the af-
firming court unequivocally embraced the ADA's position on mercury
amalgam's unconditional safety. What is even more troubling, how-
ever, was their endorsement of the ADA's view that critics of its
viewpoint must be motivated by more sinister concerns than patient
health and respect for patient autonomy.
As the 1990s continued, dentists who advocated against mercury
amalgams were subjected to further state dental association discipli-
nary proceedings. Although brought before state commissions, these
actions and their later court appeals continued to involve the ADA and
its position on several levels. State dental associations and discipli-
nary boards not only adopted the ADA's position as a matter of rou-
tine, but the board members themselves often belonged to the ADA as
well. 56 This deeply entrenched reluctance to countenance open dis-
course on the risks of mercury amalgam was further stoked by the
courts, which were bound to employ deferential standards of appellate
review on such matters.57
Breiner v. State Dental Commission illustrates the strong ties be-
tween the ADA and state dental commissions. It therefore demon-
strates the obstacles facing anti-amalgam dentists, which have led
some to charge the ADA with engaging in a "witch-hunt" of anti-
amalgam dentists. 58 In Breiner, a dentist was brought before the state
dental commission for "incompetent or fraudulent conduct by claim-
ing that the removal of mercury amalgam fillings could alleviate
54 Id. at 198. The court supported the board's finding that Dr. Hufford "un-
necessarily extract[ed] all of the patient's remaining teeth with no scientific basis for
the treatment." Id. (emphasis added).
55 See id. at 197 (concluding that "there is no justification for the removal of
serviceable amalgams" before favorably citing to the ADA position prohibiting den-
tists from advocating for mercury amalgam removal).
56 E.g., Breiner v. State Dental Comm'n, 750 A.2d 1111, 1115 (Conn. App.
2000) (involving a disciplinary board's review where the board consisted of two ADA
dentists and one public member).
57 See id. (denying injunctive relief until after all administrative proceedings
are exhausted).
58 See Maura Lemer & Karen Youso, Health Clains in Dispute Over Replac-
ing Fillings, STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis), Oct. 8, 1995, at 1A (describing the allega-
tions that a Minnesota dentist committed fraud by removing mercury fillings in his
patients); Pyle, supra note 16 (noting several cases where dentists have been sec-
tioned for distributing information about the dangers of amalgam fillings).
symptoms of various medical conditions." 59 These charges, which
attacked the dentist's views and advice rather than a concrete episode
of actual treatment, were brought not by his patients, but by other den-
tists.60 Thus, Breiner evidences the willingness of the ADA and state
boards to discipline dentists for their viewpoints, even when those
beliefs may not translate into harmful dental procedures.61
In Breiner, the ADA's role in determining the proper scope and
content of the practice of dentistry was exhibited in other ways, too.
The defendant argued that two members of the commission were bi-
ased by their view that the commission should be bound by the
ADA's guidelines and their own support of the ADA's specific posi-
tion on mercury amalgam. 62 The court found that the personal opin-
ions of these two members did not constitute bias, reasoning that
"whether removing mercury fillings because of toxicity is appropriate
are not adjudicative facts in this matter., 63 In fact, while the ADA
forbids its dentists from suggesting mercury removal under threat of
license suspension, it does not officially prohibit mercury amalgam
removal if the patient initiates such a request.64 Additionally, insofar
as the state board's position on mercury amalgam took the form of a
general standard of practice that was aimed at the entire profession, it
did not constitute bias since it had not been developed against that
individual dentist.65 The dentist further argued that the commission's
adoption of the ADA guidelines on mercury amalgam were binding,
making his administrative hearing before the commission futile.66
The court dismissed this argument, contending that the commission
had adopted a "mere guideline" and "not a statute or regulation requir-
ing compliance.,
67
As indicated by its current guidelines, the ADA continues to en-
dorse the safety of mercury amalgam and seems to have grown even
more aggressive in insisting that practicing dentists conform to this
view. For example, in 2002, the Atlanta Journal and Constitution
reported allegations that the ADA had imposed defacto "gag rules" in
" Breiner, 750 A.2d at 1114. These "various medical conditions" included
amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, anemia, and Hodgkin's disease. Id. at 1114.
I d.
61 See id. (acknowledging that the allegations rested on claims made by the
dentist-defendant as to the health benefits of mercury amalgam removal).
62 Id. at 1116.
63 Id.
64 PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS AND CODE OF PROF'L CONDUCT, supra note 42 (in-
ferring permission of mercury amalgam from the absence of a provision in the code of
professional conduct prohibiting removal).
65 Breiner, 750 A.2d at 1117.
66 id
67 Id. at 1118.
California and Maryland by forbidding anti-amalgamists from dis-
cussing their position with patients.68 A cursory review of recent pub-
lications indicates that dentists in Arizona, California, Colorado,
Maryland, and Minnesota have faced disciplinary actions for their
mercury amalgam viewpoints over the past few years.69 If anything,
these examples are likely to under-represent the true number of ac-
tions that have been brought because of anti-amalgam viewpoints.
Additionally, unlike Breiner, many actions are not appealed to the
courts; a large percentage may settle or result in board-issued sanc-
tions that may include confidentiality agreements.
In addition, the ADA no longer relies solely on its influence over
professional discipline to effectuate its views on mercury amalgam.
The ADA has recently entered into a new type of discipline: litigation
aimed at defending its reputation and discouraging further lawsuits by
patient-plaintiffs against mercury amalgam.70 For example, after a
Los Angeles attorney sued the ADA on behalf of patient-plaintiffs
claiming that mercury amalgam caused autism in children, the Asso-
ciation counter-sued the attorney on the grounds of defamation. 71 The
ADA alleges that the lawyer falsely accused it "of defrauding and
endangering the lives of the American public by promoting allegedly
unsafe dental practices-specifically the use of dental amalgam fill-
ings-and of exerting 'undue and unfair pressure' on dentists as a
result of a purported 'vested economic interest' of the ADA in amal-
gam., 72 The ADA has requested a jury trial and is seeking unspeci-
fied compensatory and punitive damages. 73 The ADA has also inter-
vened in mercury amalgam suits brought by patient-plaintiffs in which
the ADA argues in favor of mercury amalgam's safety.74
68 Wahlberg, supra note 22.
69 See Pyle, supra note 16 (reporting that an Arizona dentist is facing sanc-
tions for advocating alternative materials; a California dentist lost his license for
running an advertisement entitled: "Mercury Emission from Silver Fillings Unsafe by
Government Standards;" and a Maryland dentist was sanctioned for writing an article
on mercury amalgam removal); Lemer & Youso, supra note 58 (discussing sanctions
by state dental boards against dentists in Colorado and Minnesota for advocating
against mercury amalgam).
70 See, e.g., Pyle, supra note 16 (describing ADA action against dentists who
encourage the negative image of mercury amalgams).
Petitioner's Complaint, Am. Dental Ass'n v. Khorrami, No. 02-3852,
(C.D. Cal. filed May 14, 2002), available at
http ://www.ada.org/prof/advocacy/legal/leg_020514_khorrami.pdf
72 Id. at 2.
73 James Berry, A "Campaign ofLies ": ADA Sues "Self-Promoting" L.A.
Lawyer for Defamation, at http://www.testfoundation.orghglawsuits.htm.
74 See, e.g., Pyle, supra note 16.
While undoubtedly designed to quash the debate over amalgam
safety, the ADA's litigation strategy seems to have achieved the very
opposite result. It has angered some dentists, generated bad press for
the ADA, and exacerbated the already deep divide between pro- and
anti-amalgamists. It has also placed those dentists who would fall into
the "middle" in an increasingly difficult "Catch 22." On the one hand,
they may hold a legitimate fear of advocating against, or even discuss-
ing, mercury amalgam risks because of potential ADA sanctions. On
the other, they may experience significant discomfort with suggesting
the use or the removal of mercury fillings to their patients because of
the potential health risks, financial cost, and dearth of solid informa-
tion regarding safe removal practices.75
B. Informed Consent: Litigation Alone Cannot Protect Patient Safety
or Autonomy
Despite--or perhaps because of-the ADA's efforts to extinguish
the amalgam controversy, the anti-amalgam movement continues to
grow, with patient-plaintiffs taking the lead in a new wave of personal
injury litigation. These cases do not involve actions for negligent
mercury amalgam removal but, rather, allege negligent non-removal
of mercury fillings and/or lack of informed consent involving their
original insertion. Like most claims of professional negligence and/or
product liability, plaintiffs need to rely upon expert testimony to prove
that mercury amalgam generally causes adverse health effects and
specifically caused the health problems in the individual plaintiffs
case. While such litigation in the amalgam context is embryonic at
best, lessons gleaned from these cases to date as well as from other
product liability cases predict that any barriers erected by the ADA
are likely to pale in comparison with the difficulties in overcoming
Daubert requirements for evidentiary admissibility.
As they do in all forms of product safety and medical malpractice
litigation, the Daubert standards are likely to vex the mercury amal-
gam issue and generate pages of conflicting judicial opinions about
the viability of such claims. In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuti-
cals, Inc., the United States Supreme Court enunciated a standard by
which the judge is required to have a gate-keeping role, in which "the
trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evi-
dence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable. 76 While Daubert
75 See, e.g., id. (observing that Dr. Robert Hepps stopped using mercury
amalgam after the ADA intervened in a negligence lawsuit to disclaim its own liabil-
ity, and that he does not express his opinions to his patients out of fear of reprisals by
the ADA).
76 Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993).
seemed to suggest that expert testimony that had the potential for
"misleading the jury" could be addressed through Federal Rule of
Evidence 403, 77 later courts have concluded that the purpose behind
Daubert's gate-keeping function is to preserve the integrity and effi-
cacy of a trial's fact-finding function by keeping "unreliable and ir-
relevant information" from the jury.78 Under Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 702, scientific expert testimony is admissible:
[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to deter-
mine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may tes-
tify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the
testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testi-
mony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and
(3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably
to the facts of the case.79
In addition to the factors listed in Rule 702, to determine the prof-
fered testimony's reliability, the court should look at (1) whether the
theory or technique can be tested; (2) whether it has been subjected to
peer review; (3) whether the technique has a high known or potential
rate of error; and (4) whether the theory has attained general accep-
tance within the scientific community.80
Although the Daubert factors were intended to function as a non-
exclusive set of guidelines rather than a closed set of inflexible re-
quirements, their application in practice has served to preclude much
expert testimony, particularly in the absence of supporting epidemiol-
ogy.81 In the context of dental mercury, the ADA's and amalgam
manufacturers' investment in the status quo provides no incentive to
conduct epidemiological studies. Even under optimal circumstances,
conclusive epidemiological results would be difficult to obtain given
71 Id. at 595.
78 Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1311-12 (11 th Cir. 1999)
(applying the Daubert standard for the admissibility of epidemiological studies in
silicone breast implant litigation).
79 FED. R. EVID. 702.
80 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94.
"' See Allison, 184 F.3d at 1313-15; Grant v. Bristol-Meyers Squibb, 97 F.
Supp. 2d 986, 991-92 (D. Ariz. 2000) (stating that because the experts' inability to
specify the criteria that caused systemic disease from breast implants was "incapable
of epidemiological testing," it was insufficiently reliable); In re Breast Implant Litig.,
11 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1227 (D. Colo. 1998) (rejecting expert testimony because the
studies did not demonstrate a relative risk factor greater than two from silicone breast
implants).
the diverse nature, potentially low prevalence, and under-reporting of
adverse health effects.
The experiences of other medical product liability cases are in-
structive in assessing how Daubert is likely to hamper amalgam litiga-
tion. For example, in silicone breast implant litigation, plaintiffs'
experts frequently were prohibited from testifying about general cau-
sation (i.e., that the product is capable of causing the alleged harm in
general) and specific causation (i.e., that the product caused the harm
alleged in this specific case). Reasons for excluding such testimony
included that the methodology and conclusions were not subjected to
peer review, not accepted by the general scientific community, or oth-
erwise insufficient when compared to epidemiological studies con-
ducted by defendants' experts.82 The court in In re Breast Implant
Litigation was particularly disturbed that the plaintiff lacked any epi-
demiological studies to support a showing of general causation despite
the plaintiffs proffer of other types of scientific support.83 Further-
more, the court rejected the temporal relationship between the plain-
tiffs breast implants and health problems because, at most, it only
constituted evidence of general and not specific causation.84 Thus, the
plaintiff first had to prove the general causal link between implants
and health problems before she could show that silicone breast im-
plants had caused her specific ailments. 85 With the plaintiff's prof-
fered evidence excluded, there was no evidence of either type of cau-
sation, and the defendant therefore was awarded summary judgment.86
Similarly, in Grant v. Bristol-Myers Squibb, the court criticized
the patient's failure to produce epidemiological studies to demonstrate
causation of harm by breast implants.87 Although the patient wished
to point to differential diagnosis and clinical studies, the court held
that such evidence did not meet Daubert standards for reliability and
relevance, especially in light of the defendant's proffer of numerous
epidemiological studies showing no association between the product
and harm.88  Again, the inadmissibility of the plaintiffs evidence
meant a failure to prove causation and resulted in summary judgment
82 See Allison, 184 F.3d at 1313, 1316; Grant, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 992; In re
Breast Implant Litig., 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1217.
83 In re Breast Implant Litig., 11 F. Supp.2d at 1228 (stating that "[e]xperts
fail to present a single peer-reviewed, controlled epidemiological study that support[s]
their causation theories.").
84 Id. at 1232. The court, however, was clear that specific causation would
not withstand Daubert either.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Grant, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 992.
88 Id.
for defendant. 89 Since an appellate court must defer to a trial court's
Daubert rulings, the plaintiff's case is usually over at this stage.
Many courts in silicone breast implant litigation also refused to
admit scientific studies conducted on animals, which did indicate a
causal link between the implants and various illnesses, because they
too could not hold their own against the defense's epidemiological
studies.90 For example, in Allison v. McGhan Medical Corp., the
plaintiff experienced numerous health problems, including diabetes,
fatigue, and nerve pain following silicone breast implantation.91
These symptoms steadily improved after the patient had her implants
removed.92 She then sued the implant manufacturers, but could not
advance to trial because, following a Daubert hearing, the court re-
fused to admit her evidence of causation.93 The plaintiffs expert
planned to discuss studies conducted on rats and to explain the link
between those studies and the health problems suffered by the plain-
tiff.94 The court rejected such testimony because the plaintiff did "not
explain why the results of these animal studies should trump more
than twenty controlled epidemiological studies of breast implants in
humans which have found no valid increased risk of autoimmune dis-
ease."
95
Even when plaintiffs do rely upon epidemiology, this proof is still
subject to challenge over its design, conduct and results due to the
many judgment calls made in the course of conducting the study and
analyzing the data. Thus, what is even more troubling about Allison is
that plaintiff did manage to accumulate several epidemiological stud-
ies, but the court still excluded them because they directly contra-
dicted the defendant's twenty studies.96 The court in Allison denied
that it was looking at conclusions rather than the methodology of the
plaintiff's studies, but stated that nevertheless, the courts were not
precluded from doing so in the Daubert hearing.
97
A minority of courts dealing with silicone breast implants and
other medical product liability cases have allowed such litigation to
proceed to trial in the absence of epidemiological studies. For exam-
ple, in Jennings v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., the plaintiff sued her
silicone breast implant manufacturer, claiming that the implants rup-
89 Id.
90 E.g., Allison, 184 F.3d at 1313-14.
9' Id. at 1304-05.
92 Id. at 1305.
93 Id. at 1322.
94 Id. at 1313.
9- Id. at 1314.
96 Id. at 1314, 1315.
97 Id. at 1315.
tured and caused her personal injuries. 98 The Supreme Court of Ore-
gon allowed the plaintiff's expert to testify on the basis of differential
diagnosis and case reports based on clinical observations.99 The court
observed that while epidemiology is "at the top" of the evidentiary
hierarchy, other forms of evidence "may have some utility in attempt-
ing to ascertain whether a causal connection exists."' 00  The court
therefore admitted the expert's testimony, rejecting the belief that "an
expert opinion on causation based on anything other than statistically
significant, peer-reviewed, published epidemiological studies is inad-
missible."' 01
Similarly, in Kuhn v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., the Kansas Supreme
Court ruled in a products liability case that differential diagnosis evi-
dence was admissible. 10 2 The court determined that the established
evidentiary admissibility tests did not apply when an expert
"reach[ed] a conclusion by deduction from applying a new or novel
scientific principal [sic], formula, or procedure developed by oth-
ers." 10 3 In the absence of large epidemiological records, the plaintiff's
alternative evidence was sufficient to survive the defendant's sum-
mary judgment motion.1' 4 These courts reason that as long as the
particular methodology employed (e.g., animal studies) is valid, the
inferences to be drawn from it concerning general or specific causa-
tion are properly tested through cross-examination, impeachment, and
other methods of consideration at trial.'05 While the minority ap-
proach correctly understands and applies the Daubert holding, it is
still just that-a minority.
For these reasons, mercury amalgam plaintiffs are likely to en-
counter formidable barriers to reaching the merits of their claims due
to a lack of admissible scientific evidence of causation, particularly in
the form of epidemiological studies conducted on human subjects.
Studies conducted on sheep, monkeys and rats have demonstrated the
correlation between mercury and adverse health effects such as im-
mune suppression, neurotoxicity, renal impairments, and multiple
98 Jennings v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 14 P.3d 596, 597 (Or. 2000).
99 Id. at 608-09.
100 Id. at 607 (quoting Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of
Evidence in Toxic Substances Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and Bendectin
Litigation, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 643, 658 (1992)).
lOt Id. at 609.
102 Kuhn v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 14 P.3d 1170,1177,1185 (Kan. 2000)
(admitti n the evidence of differential diagnosis under the Frye test).
Id. at 1179.
"4 See id. at 1184-85.
10' Id. at 1184-85. See also Jennings, 14 P.3d at 609 (allowing court recon-
sideration of previously inadmissible evidence due to the changing nature of science
and research).
sclerosis, as well as adverse health effects passed from mother to fe-
tus, including brain damage, incoordination, blindness, and sei-
zures. 106 They also indicate that mercury can be transmitted across
the placenta and through breast-feeding, a link further acknowledged
by the United States Department of Health and Human Services.
10 7
While they are only animal studies, they still cast doubt on the ADA's
findings of no statistically significant effects in humans.
As discussed above, further controversy exists regarding how
much mercury is released by fillings as well as the exposure level at
which mercury becomes harmful to humans.10 8 Rather than arguing
the credibility of their anti-amalgam claims before a jury, however,
patient-plaintiffs are finding that they cannot survive pre-trial Daubert
challenges. Nevertheless, some studies regarding mercury emissions
and their effects have received recognition from the courts. 0 9 This
recognition, however, has come in the form of dicta in statutory warn-
ing violation suits and therefore does not constitute the definitive rul-
ing that anti-amalgamists desire on the evidence's admissibility for
negligent causation purposes." 0 Still, when coupled with the numer-
ous conflicts regarding how Daubert should be interpreted and ap-
plied, it offers some hope that a patient's anti-amalgam case may one
day reach a trial on the merits.
In the meantime, dentists who advocate against mercury amalgam
have found their diagnostic testing methods severely questioned in
terms reminiscent of those found in silicone breast implant litigation.
In Hufford, the dentist used a volt meter to test the mercury levels
found in the patient's mouth and applied kinesiology to determine that
the patient was allergic to certain types of restorative materials."'
Expert witnesses for the state dental board testified that such methods
have no scientific basis and that, according to the ADA, suspected
mercury allergies should be determined by blood tests administered
by qualified medical personnel. 1 2 Similarly, in Berger v. Board of
Regents, the state's expert witness testified that the dentist's mercury
106 See. e.g., Consumer Cause, Inc. v. Smilecare, 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d 637, 641
(citing Miller, Mercury Amalgam Fillings: Human and Environmental Issues Facing
the Dental Profession, I DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 355,355-59 (1996) and Agency
for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, Chemical Abstracts Service No. 7439-97-
6 (Apr. 1999), at http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/tfacts46.html (last visited Aug. 8, 2001)).
107 Smilecare, 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 631; DAMS, supra note 2; Weiss, supra
note 26.
108 See Ive, supra note 21.
109 See Smilecare, 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 631.
110 See id.
111 Bd. of Dental Exam'rs v. Hufford, 461 N.W.2d. 194, 196-97 (Iowa 1990).
..2 Id. at 197-98.
tests were unreliable and that medical approval was required for the
mercury amalgam removal procedure.' 13 Since these were discipli-
nary actions rather than personal injury claims, they did not turn on
the kinds of causation of harm issues that form the core of cases
brought by patients. Nevertheless, they do foreshadow the bases for
challenging the methodology of anti-amalgamists in future negligence
cases.
To date, there has been only one reported case dealing directly
with mercury amalgam, negligence, and evidentiary admissibility. In
McReynolds v. Mindrup ("McReynolds "), the plaintiff sued her den-
tist for malpractice, assault, battery, loss of consortium, and punitive
damages after he replaced her old filling with one containing mercury
against her express wishes.' 14 The trial court excluded the patient's
expert witnesses, including the patient's treating physician, a special-
ist in risk assessment, an immunologist, and a dentist prepared to tes-
tify that the minority position on mercury amalgam was correct and
that the ADA was wrong.1 5 Unfortunately, the brief trial opinion
does not articulate the court's specific reasoning for excluding this
testimony other than to say that evidentiary standards under Frye'
1 6
were not met.1 7 Nevertheless, McReynolds I indicates that mercury
amalgam litigation will face the same obstacles posed by Daubert's
evidentiary standards that have plagued other forms of medical prod-
uct personal injury litigation.
Ultimately, McReynolds was appealed, remanded, re-tried and ap-
pealed for a second time.1 8 At the case's second trip to the appellate
level ("McReynolds If'), the Missouri Court of Appeals found that the
trial court had exceeded its discretion with its "wholesale exclusion"
of any testimony from the plaintiff's witnesses. 1 9 Thus, any testi-
mony from the plaintiffs treating physician regarding the facts of her
113 Berger v. Bd of Regents, 577 N.Y.S.2d 500, 503 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991).
114 McReynolds v. Mindrup, 32 S.W.3d 163, 165 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000) [here-
inafter McReynolds 1], appeal after remand, McReynolds v. Mindrup, 108 S.W.3d
662 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002) [hereinafter McReynolds 17].
115 McReynolds I, 32 S.W.3d at 165.
116 Frye v. U.S., 293 F. 1013, 1014 (1923) (holding that the scientific princi-
ples from which the testimony is derived "must be sufficiently established to have
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs."). While Frye
was superceded by the Federal Rules of Evidence (see Daubert, 509 U.S. 587), it is
still the prevailing standard in some states' rules of evidence, including Missouri, (see
McReynolds 1, 32 S.W.3d at 165).
117 McReynolds 1, 32 S.W.3d at 165.
118 McReynolds v. Mindrup, 108 S.W.3d 662 (Mo.App. 2002) (herinafter
McReynolds H1).
"9 Id. at 666-67.
condition should have been admitted. 120  The appeals court noted,
however, that the trial court correctly excluded testimony "from treat-
ing medical professionals that related to scientific studies, methodolo-
gies, principles, tests, and technology that are not generally accepted
in the relevant field and any medical oinions, diagnosis, [sic] or con-
clusions drawn by those individuals."' '1 The court of appeals further
stated that testimony about the invalidity of the ADA's position on
mercury amalgam safety was correctly excluded as "irrelevant.'
122
Considering the widespread adoption of the ADA's position by the
scientific community, the government, and the dental profession, the
McReynolds II approach would effectively shut down any means for
challenging the safety of amalgams in a Frye jurisdiction.
That Daubert will be just as daunting for amalgam plaintiffs as it
has been for patients alleging harm from countless medical products is
clear from the few cases that have been initiated so far. Lawsuits
were recently filed in Georgia and California on behalf of autistic
children, claiming that their mothers' mercury fillings caused the dis-
ease. 123 The ADA's counsel responded by stating, "we are not aware
of any reputable science that suggests that there is any harm caused by
dental amalgams.' 24  Similarly, in its defamation suit against the
lawyer in the California case, the ADA asserted that the attorney was
well aware of the scientific evidence demonstrating the absolute
safety of mercury amalgam. 125 As indicated by the ADA's state-
ments, the ADA likely will pit the studies conducted by the FDA,
World Health Organization and others against the animal studies that
support the plaintiffs' contentions. 126 Obviously, therefore, the ADA
will challenge causation vigorously, and will surely invoke Daubert to
challenge the reliability of a patient's expert testimony.
In addition, a class action was recently filed in Maryland, con-
tending that the ADA engaged in fraud by not telling consumers that
amalgam fillings contained mercury. 127 The plaintiffs have requested
reimbursement for the removal of their mercury amalgam fillings.
128
120 See id. at 667.
121 Id.
'22 Id. at 668.
123 Erin McClam, Suit to Blame Dental Groups, Companies for Children's
Autism, CHATTANOOGA TIMES, April 3, 2002, at NG3; Belfast News Letter, Autistic
Boy's Parents Sue Over "Toxic" Dental Fillings, March 22, 2002, at 13.
124 McClam, supra note 123.
125 Petitioner's Complaint at 9, Am. Dental Ass'n v. Khorrami, No. 02-3852,
(C.D. Cal. filed May 14, 2002), available at
http://www.ada.org/prof/advocacy/legaleg_020514_khorrami.pdf.
126 Id. at 4-6.
127 Jennifer Huget, Filling in for Mercury, WASH. POST, Mar. 26, 2002, at F.
128 Allison Klein, Dental Groups Sued Over Use ofAmalgam Fillings,
The class representative claimed that she suffered from numbness,
metallic taste, depression, and hormone imbalance because of her
fillings and further alleged that these symptoms declined after her
fillings were removed. 129 As with In re Breast Implant Litigation,
however, the temporal relationship between the product's removal and
symptom alleviation was not deemed by the court to be sufficiently
reliable under Daubert to be admitted as evidence of general causa-
tion, especially when unaccompanied by supporting epidemiological
studies. 3 0
Since patient personal injury litigation is likely to be so hindered
by Daubert problems, the ADA's confidence in its pro-amalgam posi-
tion will surely endure. Perhaps, however, such litigation may finally
force the ADA to substantiate its own claims of amalgam safety in-
stead of relying so heavily on such tactics as challenging the gaps in
plaintiffs' evidence or gagging candid discourse among its own mem-
bers. Dental professionals allegedly have hesitated to fund and par-
ticipate in in-depth studies of the effects of mercury amalgam.' 3' The
ADA itself cannot point to any large scale epidemiological studies to
substantiate its conclusion that amalgam fillings pose no greater
health risks than non-metallic composites. 32 Unlike the defendants in
silicone breast implant litigation, which did have epidemiological
studies to rebut claims of causation, the ADA may be less successful
in excluding the animal and case studies that plaintiffs may offer.'
33
Thus, while Daubert is likely to obfuscate patient-plaintiffs in mer-
cury amalgam suits, some room may exist for admitting animal stud-
ies and differential diagnosis that support the anti-amalgam viewpoint.
BALTIMORE SUN, Feb. 22, 2002, at B3.
129 Id.
130 McReynolds I, 32 S.W.3d at 165; In re Breast Implant Litig., 11 F. Supp.
2d at 1232.
131 The Mercury in Your Mouth, CONSUMER REP., May 1991, at 316 [hereinaf-
ter CONSUMER REPORTS] (discussing the controversy surrounding the use of dental
mercury amalgam fillings).
132 Neither the FDA or the World Health Organization studies used by the
ADA were large scale or epidemiological. See supra text accompanying note 125.
133 Compare Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1314 (11 th Cir.
1999) (dismissing the plaintiff's animal studies because they stood in direct contrast
with the defendant's twenty epidemiological studies) with Consumer Cause, Inc. v.
Smilecare, 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d 627, 632 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (discussing the various
animal studies on both sides of the mercury amalgam debate, none of which constitute
the sort of controlled epidemiological studies championed in silicone breast implant
litigation).
C. State Statutes: The Best Protection for Patients
While the ADA has succeeded in maintaining the dominance of
its position on amalgams through its use of professional discipline and
the successful defense against personal injury and consumer protec-
tion litigation, anti-amalgam advocates have made significant inroads
at the state legislative level. Today, a growing number of state legis-
latures are at least considering the imposition of a duty upon dentists
to discuss the risks of mercury amalgam with their patients. These
statutes should directly affect both the practice of dentistry and the
discipline of that profession. It may also have the indirect but no less
dramatic impact of opening an alternative route of litigation for pa-
tients and consumer safety advocates under a theory of statutory viola-
tion.
The earliest statute to address mercury amalgam risks appeared in
California. Popularly known as Proposition 65, the statute was en-
acted by statewide initiative in 1986.134 Proposition 65 is not specific
to dental amalgams; rather, it requires users of identified reproductive
toxins, including mercury and mercury amalgams, to warn employees
and patients of the risks of exposure to these products. 135 To date,
Proposition 65 has been used successfully to compel dentists to warn
their patients of mercury's potential toxicity.1 3
6
Maine recently enacted an even more specific statute that requires
any dentist who uses mercury amalgam in any dental procedure to
display a poster in the waiting area and provide each patient with a
brochure about mercury amalgam. 37 The poster and brochure were
developed by the Maine Bureau of Health and discuss "the potential
advantages and disadvantages to oral health, overall human health and
the environment of using mercury or mercury amalgam in dental pro-
cedures." 138 The brochure must also explain "what alternatives are
available" and what their risks and benefits are.' 39 The legislation,
however, leaves ample room for professional disagreement and dis-
cretion, adding that the brochure may include "other information that
contributes to a patient's ability to make an informed decision choos-
134 Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986 ("Proposition
65"), CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25249.5-.13 (West 1999). See Smilecare, 110
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 633.
131 See id. § 25249.6 (stating that no one during the course of business shall
expose individuals to cancer causing chemicals "without first giving clear and reason-
able warning.").
136 See Smilecare, 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d 627, discussed in greater detail infra at n.
171 and accompanying text.
137 ME. REv. STAT. ANN. 32 §1094-C(l) (Supp. 2002).
13 Id. § 1094-C(2).
39 id.
ing between the use of mercury amalgam or an alternative material in
a dental procedure."'' 40 Since its initial enactment, the Maine legisla-
ture has amended the statute to strengthen the poster's language.
1 41
Specifically, the poster must include the words "Your dentist is re-
quired to give you a copy of this brochure in accordance with state
law" and not the words "Ask for a copy of this brochure."'142 In addi-
tion, the brochure now must state "to be careful, Canada and several
countries in Europe recommend limits on the use of mercury amal-
gam. They advise that pregnant women should not have amalgam
fillings placed or removed from their teeth."'
143
In May 2002, New Hampshire adopted a similar measure, which
requires the state's Department of Health and Human Services to de-
velop a pamphlet discussing the risks and benefits of mercury amal-
gam, as well as alternative materials.' 44 In turn, dentists are required
to give this pamphlet to patients and to discuss it with them. 45 In
addition, the health department will inform New Hampshire residents
about the risks and benefits of dental restorative materials, including
the use of mercury amalgam in children under the age of six. 146 While
the bill was under consideration by the New Hampshire legislature,
the ADA stated that it was "working closely with the New Hampshire
Dental Society to improve the onerous aspects of this legislation or
request the governor to veto it." 147 Despite the ADA's efforts to derail
the law, it took effect on January 1, 2003.148
Other states are considering bills that would greatly restrict or ban
mercury amalgam use. In Washington, pending legislation focuses on
a patient's informed consent. 14 9 The bill sets forth a detailed informed
consent form, including statements such as "[e]xposure to mercury
can permanently damage the brain, kidneys, and developing fetus,"
"[t]he harmful effects of mercury that may be passed from the mother
to the developing fetus include brain damage, mental retardation, in-
coordination, blindness, seizures, and an inability to speak," and
"[m]ercury vapor is released from dental materials containing mer-
140 Id.
141 See H.B. 1637, 120th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Me. 2001).
142 id.
143 Id.
'44 H.B. 1251, 157th Gen. Ct., 2d. Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2002).
145 id.
146 id.
147 Mark Berthold, California Defeats Amalgam Bill, ADA NEWS, May 6,
2002, at 12 (illustrating the ongoing battle against anti-amalgam legislation).
14' N.H. H.B. 1251.
149 S.B. 5066, 58th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wa. 2003) (amending Ch. 18.32 RCW
by creating additional sections).
cury, which is the number one source of mercury in the human
body."' 5 °  Importantly, the bill also prohibits disciplinary action
against a dentist for providing a patient with information about the
risks or benefits of a dental restorative material "as long as there is a
peer-reviewed scientific publication and one other dentist to support
the information" that was communicated. 15' The bill also would pro-
tect dentists who failed "to conform to policies or codes of private
organizations that are inconsistent with state law."'' 52  Under Ala-
bama's "Mercury in Dental Filling Disclosure and Prohibition Act,"
dental amalgam must bear a label, stating, "[d]ental amalgam contains
approximately fifty percent mercury, an acute neurotoxin. ' 153 It pro-
hibits dentists from placing mercury amalgam in children under the
age of eighteen, and all pregnant or lactating women. 54 All other
patients must first receive a warning that mercury causes health risks
before the dentist could proceed.
155
As the number of states ready to legislate in this area grows, so
too does the extent to which they are willing to act. In 2002, Califor-
nia considered a bill that would have completely prohibited dentists
from providing mercury fillings to any patient after July 1, 2007.156
Before that date, a dentist would have been required to provide each
patient with a written disclosure stating: "[t]his dental amalgam con-
tains approximately 50 percent mercury, a highly toxic element, and
therefore poses health risks. This product should not be administered
to children less than 18 years of age, pregnant women, or lactating
women." '157 The bill failed to proceed beyond the legislature's Health
Committee, but one of the bill's sponsors has introduced a very simi-
lar bill at the federal level.1 58 Similarly, Arizona, Georgia, and Ohio
all are considering proposals that would forbid mercury amalgam in
children under eighteen, women under forty-six, and pregnant women
of any age.' 59 For other patients, a dentist would be required to dis-
cuss the advantages and disadvantages of amalgam and alternative
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Id.
'3 H.B. 378, 2002 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2002).
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 Assem. B. 2270, 2001-02 Legis., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2002).
157 Id.
158 See Mercury in Dental Filling Disclosure and Prohibition Act, H.R. 4163,
107th Cong. (2002), discussed infra at note 182 (proposing a ban on mercury fillings).
1' H.B. 2536, 45th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2002); H.B. 1715, 146th Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2002); H.B. 598, 124th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio
2002).
materials, and display in a public area a warning about the dangers of
mercury amalgam fillings. 1
60
The state of Washington is considering a slightly different ap-
proach to the amalgam problem by seeking to resolve some of the
uncertainties regarding amalgam risks and also trying to increase pa-
tient access to mercury alternatives. House Bill 2786 would create a
task force to study mercury amalgam fillings and the scientific re-
search on its adverse health effects. 16 1 The task force would include
two "mercury-free" dentists and would be required to report to the
legislature.' 62 This report would include a statement on the FDA's
approval process, a summary of the evidence supporting the conclu-
sion that mercury amalgam is safe, the task force's conclusions re-
garding the safety of mercury amalgam, and an estimate of the benefi-
cial and adverse economic effects of a state-wide ban on mercury
amalgam. 163 The task force would also propose legislation that would
articulate a dentist's disclosure obligations.
Recognizing that cost, and not just a lack of information, is an-
other significant barrier to opting for amalgam alternatives, the Wash-
ington measure would also require dental insurance coverage to in-
clude mercury amalgam alternatives. 64 In this regard, Rhode Island
recently enacted legislation requiring, as of January 1, 2003, state
dental insurance contracts to provide coverage for non-mercury fill-
ings at no additional expense for Rhode Island's state employees. 65
Illinois is also considering extending insurance coverage for non-
mercury fillings.' 66 A bill before the Illinois state legislature would
require the state to "enact laws to provide choices to all consumers, so
that Medicaid families and moderate-income consumers on insurance
plans will be able to choose alternatives to mercury amalgam."' 67
Although such measures would make it financially more palatable
to choose non-mercury fillings, they do not necessarily extend cover-
age to removal of amalgams already in place. A 1997 Maine case
held that Blue Cross was not required to cover the costs of mercury
amalgam removal. 68 The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine noted that
160 H.B. 2536, 45th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2002); H.B. 1715, 146th Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2002); H.B. 598, 124th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio
2002).
161 H.B. 2786, 57th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2002).162 id.
163 id.
164 Id.
165 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-24.9-15(c) (2001).
166 H.R. 0689, 92d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (I11. 2002).
167 Id.
168 Fecteau v. State Employee Health Comm'n, 690 A.2d 500, 502 (Me.
"'[n]o scientific basis has been established to confirm that removal of
amalgam fillings is essential to [the] health of [the] patient"' in ques-
tion. 69 The court observed that the medical evidence regarding the
necessity of mercury amalgam removal was conflicting in general, but
only specifically cited the ADA position that mercury amalgam was
safe.' 70 Still, while the Rhode Island statute and the Illinois bill would
not require coverage for mercury amalgam removal, they arguably
move in that direction by contemplating coverage for the more expen-
sive alternative materials, at least for some segments of the popula-
tion, doing so due to safety concerns.'
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While enacting a full or partial ban on amalgams may be too radi-
cal at this time, these statutes and bills demonstrate the growing public
concern about the potential risks of mercury even if its adverse health
effects are not yet well understood. As exemplified by the Maine
statute, the debate at the statehouse level is, for the most part, being
framed as a matter of a patient's right to make an informed choice
between mercury or an alternative material. 172 Such legislative efforts
achieve what common law tort actions, particularly those rooted in the
doctrine of informed consent, should do but are unlikely to accom-
plish: respect a patient's right to receive material information in order
to make informed, autonomous decisions. An informed decision need
not be popular, reflective of the majority view, aligned with the
weight of medical authority, or even rational. It must, however, be the
patient's own, not the dentist's or the ADA's. Granted, statutorily
requiring disclosure of amalgam "risks," however remote or uncertain
they may be, is likely to fuel the public's perception that mercury
amalgam is a dangerous toxin and, thus, accelerate the trend away
from its use. It is therefore not surprising that the ADA opposes such
informed consent laws precisely because they are predicated on the
concept that dental amalgams pose health risks.
173
Since these statutes are new, there is very little case law address-
ing statutory violations. Some litigation has emerged in California,
1997) (holding that despite the recommendation of a physician, the insurer is not
required to remove amalgam fillings since it was not a covered service under its con-
tract provisions).
169 Id. at 501 (quoting the review of the insurer's denial of coverage by the
State Employee Health Commission appeals panel, which affirmed the denial).170 Id. at 502 n. 1.
171 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-24.9-15(c) (2001) (providing coverage for non-
mercury fillings to state employees only); ILL. H.R. 689 (concluding that laws should
be enacted to provide alternatives to mercury amalgam to Medicaid and moderate-
income consumers).
172 See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 32 § 1094-C(2) (Supp. 2002).
173 CONSUMER REPORTS, supra note 131, at 318.
the first state to enact a mandatory disclosure law for certain toxins,
including mercury amalgam. Plaintiffs successfully alleged violations
of the Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act in a case
where dentists did not follow Proposition 65's provisions for warning
patients that their fillings contained mercury. 74 Under Proposition
65, dentists cannot expose patients to mercury without a warning.' 75
An affirmative defense does exist: if the dentist can demonstrate that
an exposure at 1,000 times the amount in question would not cause
any observable reproductive harm, the warning is unnecessary. 76 If
the dentist is not exempt on those grounds, the warning must be "rea-
sonably calculated, considering the alternative methods available un-
der the circumstances, to make the warning message available to the
individual prior to exposure. ' 177 Failure to provide this warning can
result in a civil penalty of up to $2,500 per day for each violation in
addition to any other penalty established by law.1
78
Arguably, a Proposition 65 claim involves the kind of evidentiary
hurdles that exist with regard to Daubert in the tort context. However,
while a dentist charged with violating Proposition 65 will argue that
the amalgam risk was so de minimis that no affirmative duty to warn
attached, the burden of proving the extent of the risk rests on the de-
fendant, not the plaintiff as it does in a product liability case. Thus, in
Consumer Cause, Inc. v. Smilecare, the dentist could not base his
claim for an exemption on the plaintiffs lack of evidence to disprove
the defense nor on the plaintiff's failure to fund scientific studies or
collect data to establish the actual exposure language or the exemption
exposure level.179 Rather, under the California law, the dentists had
the burden to prove that the amalgam risk was too low to require a
warning to be given to the patient.1
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Smilecare signals a critical shift in thinking about the mercury
amalgam debate. Although the court acknowledged the pro-amalgam
positions of the ADA and other health agencies and organizations, it
did not accept the ADA's position per se.181 Furthermore, the exis-
tence of a statute, enacted by the citizens of California, gave sufficient
174 Consumer Cause, Inc. v. Smilecare, 110 Cal Rptr. 2d 627, 641 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2001).
175 See Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986 ("Proposi-
tion 65"), CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.6 (West 1999).
176 Id. § 25249.10(c).
177 Id. §§ 25249.6, 25249.11 (requiring a clear and reasonable warning and
defining warning.).1 Id. § 25249.7(b)(1) (Supp. 2004).
179 Smilecare, 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 642.
180 Id.
181 See id. at 631-33.
credence to the anti-amalgam position, and allowed the court to avoid
deciding which position was correct. 182  Consequently, the statute
merely ensures disclosure of information and vests any choice about
safety in the individual patient where it properly belongs. As a result,
the case devolved to the simple but fundamental question of whether a
statutorily required warning was issued and, if not, whether an exemp-
tion applied. 183 Because such a theory of statutory violation may pro-
vide fewer evidentiary obstacles than the Daubert dilemmas of tort
claims, this form of litigation may ultimately provide the most suc-
cessful strategy for patient-plaintiffs. It should be noted, however,
that the ADA has opposed the California statute vehemently and, to
date at least, the law's enforcement seems dependent upon consumer
watchdog organizations rather than the state.'"
As the statutory movement continues to expand at the state level,
the United States government is considering a national proposal to
eventually ban mercury amalgam fillings.' 85 House Resolution 4163
closely mirrors the bill considered by the California state legislature
last year.' 86 Indeed, one of the congressional bill's co-sponsors, Rep-
resentative Diane Watson, is from California and helped lead the anti-
amalgam statutory movement in that state. 187 Although Rep. Wat-
son's bill has yet to move beyond the committee stage, it has already
unleashed a flurry of statements in opposition from the ADA. 88 Like
its California counterpart, Watson's bill would eventually ban mer-
cury amalgam and, in the interim, would require strict labeling, dis-
closure, and use restrictions.
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Despite the early promise of the state statutory movement in fos-
tering consumer choice while side-stepping Daubert's hurdles, it is
not without problems. In addition to the countless difficulties in get-
ting a law passed and enforced, the ADA and amalgam producers will
182 See id. at 633.
183 See id. at 636-37.
184 See Pyle, supra note 16.
185 Mercury in Dental Filling Disclosure and Prohibition Act, H.R. 4163,
107th Cong. (2002) (proposing a ban on mercury dental fillings).
186 See Assem. B. 2270, 2001-2001 Legis, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2002).
187 See id. See also Stephen Barrett, U.S. Rep. Diane Watson Introduces
Anti-Amalgam Bill, at http://www.quackwatch.org/l lInd/Watson/watson.html (last
modified May 12, 2002).
188 See, e.g., American Dental Association Statement on H.R. 4163, the Mer-
cury Fillings Disclosure and Prohibition Act, U.S. NEWSWURE, Apr. 12, 2002 (quoting
ADA Executive Director that House Resolution 4163 will increase costs and deprive
patients of a material that is "scientifically substantiated to be safe and effective"),
available at http://releases.usnewswire.com/printing.asp?id=1 30-04122002.
189 H.R. 4163 § 3.
argue that such statutes are preempted by federal law.' 90 While they
have yet to succeed on this point, current Supreme Court opinions
create enough loopholes and ambiguities to ensure that vulnerability
to preemption is a serious concern.
In Committee of Dental Amalgam Manufacturers and Distributors
v. Stratton,19' for example, amalgam manufactures sought a declara-
tory judgment that California's Proposition 65 was preempted by the
Medical Device Amendments ("MDA") to the Food, Drug, and Cos-
metics Act ("FDCA"). 192 Both the district and appellate courts found
that dental amalgam did constitute a medical device, thereby bringing
it within the purviews of the MDA. 193 The issue thus became whether
Proposition 65's warning requirements were preempted by the
MDA. 194 Section 360(k) of the MDA provides:
[N]o state or political subdivision of a state may establish or
continue in effect with respect to a device intended for human
use any requirement: "(1) which is different from, or in addi-
tion to, any requirement applicable under this chapter to
the device, and (2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness
of the device or to any other matter included in a requirement
applicable to the device under this chapter."
1 95
The district court held that the FDA affirmatively chose not to
impose any reproductive toxicity warning requirements on dental
amalgam. 96 Accordingly, Proposition 65 was different from, and in
addition to, the FDA's requirements and therefore was preempted.
97
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, relying heavily
upon the Supreme Court's holding in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,
198
which dealt with the same MDA preemption provision as in Strat-
ton.199 In Medtronic, the Court held that the MDA did not preempt
190 See, e.g., Comm. of Dental Mfrs. v. Henry, 871 F. Supp. 1278 (S.D. Cal.
1994), rev'd sub nom., Comm. of Dental Amalgam Mfrs. & Distribs. v. Stratton, 92
F.3d 807 (9th Cir. 1996).
191 92 F.3d 807.
192 Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA), 21 U.S.C. §§ 360(c)-(k).
193 Henry, 871 F. Supp. at 1281; Stratton, 92 F.3d at 810-11.
4 Stratton, 92 F.3d at 812-14 (rejecting district court's holding that Proposi-
tion 65 is preempted).
195 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a).
196 Henry, 871 F. Supp. at 1284.
197 Id.
198 Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 502 (1996) (plurality opinion)
(holding that § 360(k) did not preempt all potential state common law causes of ac-
tion, particularly where the common law rule was general rather than pertaining to
specific devices).
199 See Stratton, 92 F.3d at 811-13.
Lohr's common law claims against a defective pacemaker.2 °0 Pre-
emption would conceivably occur where the statute was specific as to
a particular device, but because the MDA requirements, however,
dealt with regulation generally and not with specific devices, they
were "not the sort of concerns regarding a specific device or field of
device regulation that the statute or regulations were designed to pro-
tect from potentially contradictory state requirements. 20 ' Moreover,
the Florida common law requirements at issue were general and not
developed "with respect to [a] medical device[]. '202  Such non-
specificity allowed the state law to evade federal preemption.
If, on the other hand, the state statute and/or federal regulation
specifically concerned a particular medical device, the plurality in
Medtronic would seemingly find preemption.20 3 Justice Breyer was
more explicit in stating that state common law claims could some-
times be preempted by the MDA when its application created a "re-
quirement.. .which [is] different from, or in addition to, any [federal]
requirement. ' '204 Justice Breyer also suggested that preemption could
be extended to the corresponding standards of care for common law
claims.20 5 The dissent would go even further, reasoning that state
common law claims were in fact "requirements" under the MDA and,
therefore, preempted when they impose something different from the
FDCA's requirements.20 6 Justice O'Connor contended that some of
the common law claims dealt with the labeling and warning of Me-
dronic's pacemaker device, compelling requirements different from
those imposed under the FDCA and resulting in preemption under the
extensive labeling requirements already imposed by federal law.207
In applying these principles of Medtronic, the Ninth Circuit in
Stratton interpreted the MDA's provisions to mean that preemption
occurs only if a specific requirement or regulation exists in reference
to a particular device.20 8 It found no such preemption of Proposition
65 since it was a general state law that was not enacted with respect to
medical devices specifically. Rather, Proposition 65 applies to all
products and services that meet the definition of a reproductive
20 Medronic, 518 U.S. at 502.
20 Id. at 501(distinguishing the facts in Medtronic from a hypothetical case in
which Congress regulated a specific device or field of devices in the face of "poten-
tially contradictory state requirements").
202 Id.
203 See id.
204 Id. at 503 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting § 360(k)(a) of the MDA).
205 Id. at 504-05 (Breyer, J., concurring).
206 Id. at 509 (O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting).
201 Id. at 513-14 (O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting).
208 Stratton, 92 F.3d at 812 (relying on FDA regulation 808.1(d)).
209toxin. Mercury is listed as one of many reproductive toxins, and
thereby requires certain warnings, but no specific regulation or re-
quirement is aimed solely at mercury or mercury amalgam.21 °
Based on Stratton and Medtronic, it is not certain that mercury
amalgam warning statutes will always survive preemption. The dis-
senting opinion in Medtronic certainly envisions that state common
law warning requirements are different from and in addition to the
FDCA provisions, and can trigger preemption.21' It is likely that these
Justices would therefore find explicit product-specific labeling or
warning requirements even more obviously deserving of preemption.
The plurality opinion, moreover, suggests that in certain circum-
stances, a state statute could be preempted.21 2 This uncertainty should
worry anti-amalgamists, especially when considering such statutes as
those in Maine and New Hampshire and the partial bans proposed in
Alabama, Arizona, and Georgia, among others.213 Unlike California's
product-neutral Proposition 65, these bills specifically deal with warn-
ing requirements for the particular device of mercury amalgam.214 As
such, they may contain the specificity and particularity necessary for
MDA preemption.
It is therefore essential that states contemplating legislation as a
way to address concerns about mercury's safety should consider Med-
tronics' implications for the actual focus and content of such a meas-
ure. Additionally, legislators must recognize that, should Congress
amend the FDCA or pass other legislation regulating mercury amal-
gam specifically, preemption may occur. The FDA currently is con-
sidering suggestions for more stringent labeling requirements for mer-
cury amalgam, which would go above and beyond those already in
place for all Class II devices.215 If these requirements are adopted, an
even stronger case for preemption would occur, particularly where the
state statute involved specifically targets mercury amalgams.
209 Id. at 813.
210 See id. at 810.
211 Medtronic, Inc., 518 U.S. at 509 (O'Connor, J., concurring and dissent-
ing).
212 Id. at 500-02.
213 ME. REv. STAT. ANN. 32 § 1094-C (Supp. 2002); H.B. 378, 2002 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2002); H.B. 2536, 45th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2002); H.B. 1715,
146th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (2002 Ga.); H.B. 1251, 157th Gen. Ct., 2d. Reg.
Sess. (N.H. 2002).
214 ME. REv. STAT. ANN. 32 § 1094-C (Supp. 2002); H.B. 378, 2002 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2002); H.B. 2536, 45th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2002); H.B. 1715,
146th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (2002 Ga.); H.B. 1251, 157th Gen. Ct., 2d. Reg.
Sess. (N.H. 2002).
215 See Dental Devices, supra note 7.
The ADA clearly recognizes the continuing potential of the pre-
emption argument. In its comments on the FDA's new guidelines for
reclassifying mercury amalgam as a Class II device, the ADA argues
that this very reclassification "should operate to preempt state laws
that conflict with the requirements encompassed by the proposed
rule."2 16 The ADA claims that state laws requiring disclosure of risks
to patients or abolishing dental amalgam are "directly at odds and
incompatible with the federal requirements set forth by the FDA. 217
Additionally, the Association contends that it is "not in the public
interest to have competing state requirements that conflict with special
controls proposed by the [FDA], nor is it appropriate under the
[FDCA] to permit states to ban the sale of dental amalgam products,
which are cleared to market by [the] FDA. 218 The ADA argues that
under Medtronic, state legislation conflicted with the FDCA, adding,
"Congress expressly provided for federal preemption of state laws
regarding medical devices . . . and [the] ADA strongly believes that
the proposed rule should be construed as preempting all state regula-
tions regarding dental amalgam products which are in significant con-
travention of the FDA imposed federal requirements., 219 However,
should Rep. Watson ever succeed in her efforts to have Congress ban
mercury amalgams, the state statutory movement and its potential
preemption would become moot in the face of a federal prohibition on
mercury amalgam.22°
IlI. CONCLUSION
The mercury amalgam debate allows for a fascinating examina-
tion of the intersection of law and science and the allocation of deci-
sion-making authority in matters of risk and uncertainty. Despite the
ADA's enduring endorsement of mercury amalgams, science has yet
to: (1) state with certainty that mercury amalgam is safe, (2) identify
at what levels it becomes harmful to humans, or (3) ascertain how
much mercury is released into the body from mercury fillings. Al-
though a patient is legally entitled to information regarding the risks
and benefits of proposed and alternative treatments, the ADA and
216 AM. DENTAL ASS'N, AMERICAN DENTAL ASSOCIATION'S COMMENTS ON
FDA's PROPOSED RULE & SPECIAL CONTROL GUIDANCE ON DENTAL AMALGAM
PRODUCTS 38, available at
www.ada.org/prof/resources/positions/statements/amalgam3.asp.
217 Id. at 38-39.
218 Id. at 39.
219 Id. at 43.
220 Mercury in Dental Filling Disclosure and Prohibition Act, H.R. 4163,
107th Cong. (2002).
state dental boards have vehemently resisted informing patients about
the risks of mercury amalgams. Instead, professional regulation has
been aimed at disciplining dentists who advocate against mercury
amalgams or simply want to inform the patient about both sides of the
controversy.
An increase in litigation by patients against dentists and the ADA
for failure to warn or for non-removal of mercury amalgams may in-
spire additional scientific research. However, in the short-term,
Daubert issues portend limited successes for these patient-plaintiffs.
For this reason, state statutes offer the best method of protecting pa-
tients and effectuating their autonomy. Statutory violation suits
largely avoid the obstacles posed by Daubert, while protecting the
patient's right to be informed about mercury's potential risks. Addi-
tionally, enacting and enforcing such statutes will raise public aware-
ness about the risks of mercury amalgam and the need for further
study. These laws, however, must be drafted with care in order to
avoid federal preemption.
The health risks and legal issues surrounding mercury amalgams
paint, at worst, a bullying image and, at best, a less than flattering
portrayal of the ADA, an organization that is supposed to represent an
entire profession, promote the safety of overall dental health, and pro-
tect-and respect-the patients it serves. Instead of troubling the
ADA, the scientific uncertainty regarding amalgams poses real obsta-
cles for patient-plaintiffs in both the health and legal contexts. Hope-
fully, both litigation and legislation will serve as an incentive for fur-
ther in-depth study of mercury amalgam and its effects, and begin to
answer the many questions about this material's risks.
In the meantime, legislators, litigants, and (most especially) dental
professionals must realize that, uncertain or not, the risks of mercury
amalgams ultimately must be weighed by the person who will bear
them: the individual patient. And the law is quite certain that, at a
minimum, the patient has a right to be informed of those risks.
